We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. An e¤ortmaximizing designer commits to a vector of player-speci…c biases (advantages or disadvantages).
Introduction
In a contest, players exert costly e¤orts to win a prize. We call a contest between players X and Y "unbiased"if swapping the e¤orts of X and Y implies swapping of the probabilities of winning. 1 A previous version of this paper circulated under the name "On the Suboptimality of Perfectly Leveling the Playing Field in Dynamic Contests." We are pleased to acknowledge useful comments by Mikhail Drugov, Christian Ewerhart, Jörg Franke, Qiang Fu, Kai Konrad, Dan Kovenock, Jingfeng Lu, Tore Nilssen and Anil Yildizparlak. We would like to thank participants at the 2018 CBESS Conference on Contests (University of East Anglia), at the 30 th Tax Day (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance) and the Games and Contests Workshop (Wageningen University). All errors are our own. y Tulane University. Email : sbarbier@tulane.edu z Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. Email : marco.serena85@gmail.com 1 This property is alternatively called "anonimity" in the seminal axiomatization of Skaperdas (1996) .
Politics: an accepted fact of US presidential elections is that vice-presidential candidates win extra votes for their ticket in their home states (e.g., Heersink and Peterson, 2016) . One initial evidence of home-state advantage is provided by Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) . Heersink and Peterson (2016) …nd that the vice-presidential home-state advantage "could have swung four presidential elections since 1960, if presidential candidates had chosen running mates from strategically optimal states." Moreover, a presidential candidate born and raised in one state is likely to have a home advantage in that state, as shown by the fact that only four candidates (James K. Polk, Woodrow Wilson, Richard Nixon, and Donald Trump) have won the presidency despite losing their state of residence. 6 Procurement: a source of home-…eld advantage is the governments' preference for domestic over foreign suppliers, ceteris paribus; e.g., Brulhart and Trionfetti (2004) and references therein. This is considered to be a serious and pervasive issue; as reported by La¤ont and Tirole (1991) : "[...]the European Economic Commission, alarmed by the abnormally large percentage (above 95% in most countries) of government contracts awarded to domestic …rms is trying to design rules that would foster fairer competition between domestic and foreign suppliers." R&D races: a source of advantage arises from players'special expertise. The Joint Strike Fighter contest is a famous instance; Boeing and Lockheed Martin, the two main contenders, competed on the development of the components needed to submit a winning prototype of a Joint Strike Fighter. Lockheed had a substantial advantage in warplane expertise, while Boeing had an advantage in developing wings (see, NOVA, 2003) . Lockheed eventually won, and its warplane expertise played a key role; "Lockheed may have clinched the deal because of its experience with the development and production of the F-22." (Frost & Sullivan Market Insight, 2001).
In the above applications, competition often unfolds over time, through a series of interim matches where players' advantages vary. Concerning biases, the player who has the advantage is often endogenous in each match; in fact, one can think of choosing the location of each match, which generates the above-mentioned home-…eld advantage. On top of this, the extent to which the designer has control over the size of the biases varies. In sports, a home-…eld advantage can be mitigated by introducing instant replays to weaken the referees' discretion or by reserving a certain proportion of tickets for the visiting team. The winner of the previous round is sometimes advantaged (e.g., the pool player who shoots a ball into a table's pocket makes the next move) and sometimes disadvantaged (the soccer team who scores a goal does not kick the ball next). In politics, public …nancing of candidates may exacerbate or mitigate valence di¤erences between candidates. In procurement, the advantage to home suppliers might be quite explicitly mandated and carefully targeted, as for "[...]the United States's 'Buy American Act', which in di¤erent cases requires U.S. suppliers to be chosen despite cost disadvantages of up to 6 (normal), 12 (small businesses and …rms in regions of high unemployment) or 50 percent (military equipment). Explicit national preferences are also applied in Canada, Australia and New Zealand [...] ." (Vagstad, 1995) .
In order to account for such varying control over biases across applications, we consider two alternative settings. First, the designer has full control over the biases (Section 4) , in the sense that biases are contingent on the outcome of previous matches; for instance, if X wins today, she will be given a disadvantage tomorrow, otherwise an advantage. We …nd that the e¤ort-maximizing designer leaves the …rst and (if necessary) third matches unbiased, and biases the second match in favor of the loser of the …rst match, so as to completely compensate for her disadvantage of lagging one match behind. Such a structure of biases leaves players equally likely to win each match and the entire contest. In this sense, we conclude that, when the designer can tailor the biases to the outcome of previous matches, the conventional wisdom of equalizing players'equilibrium winning probabilities carries over to our dynamic setting. This result contributes to our understanding of whether, in subsequent matches, one should favor the winner or the loser of early matches. In particular, this result contrasts with the common "favor-the-leader"result in the literature that we discuss below.
Second, in the perhaps more realistic case of limited control (Section 5), the designer cannot tailor the biases to the outcome of previous matches; e.g., whoever plays at home today plays away tomorrow, regardless of who wins today. We …nd that the e¤ort-maximizing designer does not treat ex-ante identical players identically; in particular, rather than leaving the contest unbiased, the optimal biases favor one player …rst and the other later. Moreover, these two e¤ects do not balance out ex-ante; that is, the optimal alternating biases leave ex-ante identical players ex-ante unequally likely to win the contest. To understand the intuition behind the optimality of alternating biases, recall that in dynamic contests early victories distort future matches so that the laggard gives up and the front-runner eases up. This well-known result is mitigated in our context by alternating biases, which give one player an advantage in the …rst match and the other player an advantage in the second. Such an alternation of biases, despite creating a bias in the …rst match -thus reducing …rst-match e¤orts -balances the second match since the most likely second-match laggard is given an advantage -thus increasing second-match expected e¤orts. Most importantly, it increases the probability of the game reaching the tie-breaker -thus increasing third-match e¤orts. 7 We show that the second-and third-match positive e¤ects on e¤orts overcome the …rst-match negative e¤ect. The optimality of introducing biases into a symmetric contest between ex-ante identical players is a key …nding of the present paper, hence we challenge its robustness and show that it holds when matches are modeled both as Tullock contests and all-pay auctions, and both under maximization of total e¤ort and winner's e¤ort. 8 We conclude that the conventional wisdom of unbiased contest 7 Note that the third match is virtually certain to occur if an arbitrarily high advantage is given in the …rst period to a player and in the second period to her rival. 8 For the all-pay auction we need to add the technical assumption of private information because otherwise rents optimality does not carry over to a dynamic setting when the designer cannot tailor biases to the outcome of previous matches.
Literature. There are two strands of the literature that are usually -but not exclusivelykept apart; dynamic contests and biased contests. On dynamic contests, one of the ground-breaking theoretical contribution is that of Klumpp and Polborn (2006) ; they model the US primaries as a best-of-n contest between two candidates, where the battle…eld in each state takes the form of a Tullock contest. As it is typical in tournaments, they …nd that the outcome of the very …rst match creates an asymmetry between ex-ante symmetric players that is endogenously carried over to later periods. This momentum boosts e¤orts in the …rst matches and make the latest matches less relevant. This …nding resemble the so-called "New Hampshire e¤ect"; candidates who win early primaries are more likely to win later primaries, too. 9 Similar …ndings are those of Konrad and Kovenock (2009) , who model stage-battle…elds as all-pay auctions, and of Ferrall and Smith (1999) who adopt rank-order tournaments of Lazear and Rosen (1981) . Malueg and Yates (2006) generalize Klumpp and Polborn's (2006) results to a general symmetric contest success function and derive results for a three-battle contest assuming the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. 10 All the above models, as the vast majority of the literature on dynamic contests, restrict attention to either unbiased or exogenously biased contests. Our main point of departure from this strand of the literature is the introduction of endogenous biases.
The literature on biases in static contest is extensive. The conventional wisdom typically drawn from this strand of the literature is the optimality of an unbiased contest if the two players are symmetric. 11 A prominent recent exception to this wisdom of static contests arises in Drugov and Ryvkin (2017); 12 they characterize properties of the contest success function and of the cost of e¤ort that determine whether a biased or unbiased contest is optimal. In the standard Tullock contest with linear costs of e¤ort, multiplicative bias and static competition, Drugov and Ryvkin (2017) show that the conventional wisdom of unbiased contest optimality is not robust to dropping the assumption of multiplicative bias. In contrast, we maintain the multiplicative biases, but challenge would be fully dissipated, thus making our exercise trivial. 9 A victory in the New Hampshire primary increases a candidate's expected share of total primary votes by 26.6% (Mayer, 2004 ).
1 0 Empirical tests of theoretical predictions with sports data is provided for best-of-three contests by Malueg and Yates (2010) and for best-of-n by Ferrall and Smith (1999 Drugov and Ryvkin (2017) . Serena (2017) shows that the conventional wisdom holds not only for maximization of total e¤ort, but also winner's e¤ort. 1 2 Other exceptions to the conventional wisdom can be derived from an extension of the model to an ex-ante heterogenous n-player setting (e.g., Franke et al., 2013) , to a private information setting (e.g., Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2016), and to maximization of the probability of a high-ability winner (e.g., Kawamura and Moreno de Barreda, 2014). In the present paper, we keep the standard two-player complete information setting under e¤ortmaximization.
the conventional wisdom in a dynamic, rather than static, setting. We …nd that when the designer can (cannot) tailor the biases to the outcome of previous matches, players are optimally left equally (unequally) likely to win each match and the overall contest.
We are not the …rst to consider biases in dynamic contests (see, for instance, Meyer, 1991 Meyer, , 1992 Lizzeri et al., 1999 Lizzeri et al., , 2002 Hö-er and Sliwka, 2003; Aoyagi, 2010; Ederer, 2010) . 13 A common …nding is the "favor-the-leader" result; for example, Meyer (1991 Meyer ( , 1992 shows that biasing the second match in favor of whoever performed better in the …rst match tends to be bene…cial for the principal in terms of better information and of larger e¤orts, as one obtains only a secondorder negative e¤ect of bias in the second period, but a …rst-order positive e¤ect of bias in the …rst period. More recently, Clark et al. (2012) , Möller (2012), Beviá and Corchón (2013) , Esteve-Gonzáles (2016) and Klein and Schmutzler (2017) analyse a two-period setting assuming that if a player wins (or exerts higher e¤ort) in the …rst period she is given a certain advantage in the second period-modeled as a lower marginal cost of e¤ort, or as a favorable bias in the contest success function. Instead, in our best-of-three setting with victory-dependent bias, we allow for second-period advantages and disadvantages to the …rst-period winner, and we …nd that the latter is optimal, hence countering the typical "favor-the-leader" result.
Related to our setup with victory-dependent biases is Feng and Lu (2018), who analyse the e¤ortmaximizing allocation of prizes among battles in a best-of-three contest. Their "main insight is that mitigating the momentum/discouragement e¤ect is essential for e¤ort-maximizing prize design in dynamic multi-battle contests."In contrast, our model endogenizes biases rather than allocation of prizes among matches. Our results call for the complete elimination of the discouragement e¤ect when biases are victory-dependent. Furthermore, we highlight that whether or not the designer's intervention is victory-dependent plays a crucial role in addressing the discouragement e¤ect.
Model
Two risk-neutral and ex-ante identical players, X and Y , play in a best-of-three contest. That is, they play at most three matches, and the …rst player who wins two matches is the contest winner and obtains a prize equal to V > 0. In Figure 1 we draw the structure of the best-of-three contest we describe. The game begins at node (0; 0), where no player has won a match; here, e¤orts are denoted as x (0;0) and y (0;0) . The game then moves to node (1; 0) or (0; 1) according to whether X or Y , respectively, wins the …rst match in (0; 0); here, e¤orts are denoted as x (1;0) and y (1;0) , or x (0;1) and y (0;1) . If the …rst two matches are won by the same player the game ends, otherwise the game reaches node (1; 1) and the third match is played; here, e¤orts are denoted as x (1;1) and y (1;1) . In each node (i; j), if reached, players simultaneously choose e¤orts (x (i;j) ; y (i;j) ), and the probability of victory of player X in that match depends on the contest technology as follows:
where (i;j) 2 (0; 1) and p
X (x (i;j) ; y (i;j) ). 14 We refer to (i;j) > 1 ( (i;j) < 1) as an advantage (disadvantage) given to X in node (i; j). The vector of biases f (0;0) ; (1;0) ; (0;1) ; (1;1) g is commonly known at the beginning of the game. There is complete information and the marginal cost of e¤ort equals 1 for both players. We analyse how the expected total e¤ort (henceforth, T E) varies with the 's. We de…ne T E as follows
For simplicity, in (2) we omitted the arguments of probabilities and e¤orts, as we will do throughout the paper whenever this does not yield confusion.
Structure of the paper. In Section 3 we provide some general preliminary results that apply to each node and that we specialize node-by-node in Appendix A. In Section 4, 's are victory-dependent; that is, a possibly di¤erent is chosen for each node, so that four biases f (0;0) ; (1;0) ; (0;1) ; (1;1) g are chosen in order to maximize T E. We …nd that the optimal 's leave the two players equally likely to win in every node and in the entire best-of-three contest. 15 In Section 5 instead, 's are victory-independent; that is, 's cannot be conditioned on the outcome of the previous matches, so that three biases f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g are chosen in order to maximize T E; in the …rst match (i.e., node (0; 0)) player X is given bias 1 , in the second match (i.e., node (1; 0) or (0; 1)) she is given bias 2 , and in the third match (i.e., node (1; 1)), if played, she is given bias 3 . The extra constraint of victory-independent 's is inspired by the applications, as discussed in the Introduction. We …nd that the optimal 's leave players unequally likely to win in every node and in the entire best-of-three contest; in particular, it is optimal to give a large advantage to a player, say X, in the …rst match, and balance it out with a medium advantage to player Y in the second match and a small advantage to player Y in the third match, if necessary. 16 Since we deem this result the most striking of the paper, we show that it is robust to: 1 4 Any p (i;j) X (0; 0) 2 (0; 1) speci…ed using one of the "usual" tie-breaking rules for no e¤orts will leave our results unchanged. 1 5 The complete analytical derivation is provided in Appendix B. 1 6 The complete analytical derivation is provided in Appendix C. The interest in total e¤ort or the expected winner's e¤ort crucially depends on the speci…c application one has in mind. In sport contests the audience might …nd a lackluster of performance of the teams disappointing, thus total e¤ort maximization is a suitable objective. In contrast, in a research contest only the winner's project is typically implemented and hence only the winner's e¤ort is bene…cial for the contest designer (see also Serena, 2017 ).
Preliminaries
Denoting with u W X and u W Y the expected (continuation) payo¤ of player X and Y in case of winning, and denoting with u L X and u L Y the expected (continuation) payo¤ of player X and Y in case of losing, the individual payo¤ u X of player X in a general node with bias reads
De…ning the "e¤ective prize spread" as
we obtain
Similarly, for player Y , de…ning the e¤ective prize spread as
The equilibrium is uniquely identi…ed by the FOCs, which give the typical property
the equilibrium e¤orts
the equilibrium probabilities of victory
and the equilibrium payo¤s
Summing (3) and (4), and using (5) and (6), we obtain the following property, which we use repeatedly in our proofs,
The conventional wisdom that in a static contest ex-ante identical players should be left equally likely to win in equilibrium is apparent in (9) ; x+y is maximized when p X = p Y = 1=2. In Appendix A, we specialize the above analysis for each node, (0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1), and (1; 1), substituting the appropriate continuation value.
Victory-dependent biases
The problem of maximizing T E when a possibly di¤erent is chosen at each node has four choice variables, f (0;0) ; (1;0) ; (0;1) ; (1;1) g. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. With victory-dependent biases, the point f (0;0) ; (1;0) ; (0;1) ; (1;1) g = f1; 1=3; 3; 1g is the unique global maximum for T E in R 4 >0 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
The "asymmetric"nodes (1; 0) and (0; 1), where one player is leading by one match, are a¤ected by the discouragement e¤ect typically present in dynamic contests without endogenous biases. With endogenous biases, Proposition 1 shows that it is optimal to give the laggard an advantage in these asymmetric nodes; namely, if X loses the …rst match, the game reaches node (0; 1) and X is given an advantage of (0;1) = 3, while if X wins the …rst match, the game reaches node (1; 0) and X is given a disadvantage of (1;0) = 1=3. These 's eliminate the competitive unbalancedness due to the discouragement e¤ect and leave players equally likely to win the second-match in equilibrium, as Corollary 1 shows. The "symmetric"nodes (0; 0) and (1; 1), where players have identical continuation values and have won an identical number of matches, are optimally left unbiased by setting (0;0) = (1;1) = 1. Therefore, the unique global maximum of Proposition 1 leaves players equally likely to win each match and the entire contest;
The optimal vector of biases of Proposition 1 yields p
The result in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 may at …rst appear an intuitive extension of the common wisdom of static contest. However, further re ‡ection reveals it to be surprising. Intuitively, if today's victory grants an advantage tomorrow, a player …ghts …ercely today so as to require less e¤ort to win tomorrow. This simple intuition has been extensively analysed by the literature. The general …nding, stemming from Meyer (1992) , is that the second match should be biased in favor of the winner of the …rst match in order to increase total e¤ort because, "starting with no bias, the introduction of a small amount in favor of the …rst-period winner generates a …rst-order increase in …rst-period incentives, but only a second-order reduction in second-period incentives."This strand of the literature would suggest leaving some small advantage in the second match to the winner of the …rst match by setting (0;1) = 3 " and symmetrically (1;0) = 1=(3 "), which would result in p
Indeed, one can verify that in our setup this would result in an increase in …rst-period e¤orts and a negligible decrease in second-period e¤orts, in line with the "favor-the-leader" literature. However, in our best-of-three setup, a new force arises: moving away from " = 0 has an extra negative …rst-order e¤ect due to a lower probability of reaching node (1; 1). Proposition 1 shows that the bene…cial e¤ect of setting " = 0 in terms of probability of reaching node (1; 1) overwhelms the "favor-the-leader" increase in …rst-period e¤orts that setting " > 0 generates.
Thus, the conventional wisdom of static contests, namely to leave players equally likely to win in equilibrium, carries over to each node and to the entire contest in our dynamic model. However, this is clearly possible since the designer can tailor the biases to the outcome of previous matches, so as to keep competition …erce at all nodes and to eliminate the discouragement e¤ect. In the remainder of the paper we characterize and discuss the optimal vector of biases when the designer cannot tailor the biases to the outcome of previous matches.
Victory-independent biases
Under victory-independent 's the model has the extra constraint (0;1) = (1;0) with respect to Section 4. More in general, (i;j) = i+j+1 with i; j 2 f0; 1g; that is, i+j+1 is given to player X in the (i + j) th -match regardless of the outcome of previous matches. Thus, the vector of biases used to maximize T E boils down to f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g; one bias per match. Under such a constraint, it is clearly impossible to induce an equal equilibrium probability of winning across players at each node of the contest. An easy way to see this is that since 2 cannot depend on the outcome of the …rst match, one can set 2 so as to achieve at most one between p (1;0) X = 1=2 and p (0;1) X = 1=2. In this sense, the discouragement e¤ect cannot be completely eliminated as in Section 4, but can be at most mitigated.
An equal equilibrium probability of winning across players at each node implies an equal equilibrium probability of winning the entire contest. Since the former can no longer be achieved, it is natural to ask whether the latter remains optimal, and in particular whether e¤ort-maximization is achieved at 1 = 2 = 3 = 1. For this purpose, we de…ne,
The main analytical result of this section, formally proven in Proposition 2, is that a fully unbiased contest is not optimal. In order to pinpoint the economic forces behind the result, we focus on a particular contest structure that improves upon a fully unbiased contest, namely,
This structure resembles a typical practice observed, for instance, in sports; namely, the alternation of home matches between X and Y , followed by an unbiased tie-breaker (i.e., the …nal match).
Intuition. Before the formal statement of the result, we provide the intuition behind the suboptimality of a fully unbiased contest by showing that T E increases as we move from a fully unbiased contest to an alternating contest (i.e., setting > 1 wlog). When we do so, three e¤ects arise, 1. The …rst e¤ ect concerns the …rst match: node (0,0). In a fully unbiased contest the …rstmatch continuation value is identical across players. Thus, since players are ex-ante identical, an alternating contest creates an asymmetry in the continuation value that unbalances the …rst match, hence reducing e¤orts. This parallels the conventional wisdom of static contests. Thus, the …rst e¤ect on e¤orts is negative.
2. The second e¤ ect concerns the second match: node (1,0) or (0,1). In an alternating contest player X is given an advantage in the …rst match, and thus she is the most likely winner of the …rst match, but she is also disadvantaged in the second match. Hence, the e¤ect of her second-match disadvantage is more likely to attenuate than enhance her lead; in other words, the second-match bias is more likely to help the second-match laggard rather than the second-match leader. Thus, the second e¤ect on e¤orts is positive.
3. The third e¤ ect concerns the third match: node (1,1). This node is not necessarily reached, and its probability of being reached is what drives its e¤ect on T E; a greater bias given …rst to X and then to Y increases the probability of reaching (1, 1) . This is easy to see for extreme alternating biases ( ! 1), where node (1,1) is reached with certainty. Total e¤ort increases with the existence of (1,1). Thus, the third e¤ect on e¤orts is positive.
As we work towards concluding that the overall e¤ect is positive, we neglect the second (positive) e¤ect, and show that the third (positive) e¤ect by itself su¢ ces to overcome the …rst (negative) e¤ect. In words, we show that, when moving from a fully unbiased contest to an alternating contest, the bene…cial e¤ect on e¤orts of increasing the probability of existence of node (1,1) overcomes the decrease in e¤orts at node (0,0).
Unfortunately, a local, …rst-order intuition around = 1 in an alternating contest is not helpful to draw conclusions. The reason is that both the …rst and the third e¤ects have zero derivative at = 1. 17 In fact, the probability of existence of node (1,1) and the total e¤ort in (0,0) have zero derivative at = 1. While the latter fact is known by the conventional wisdom, the former can be intuitively seen, neglecting e¤ort di¤erences, in the probability of existence of node (1; 1) in an alternating contest, which is
and has zero …rst derivative at = 1.
Since a …rst-order derivation does not su¢ ce to show that the third e¤ect dominates the …rst, in the analytical proofs we derive and compare second-order e¤ects (Appendix C-D-E-F-G). In the intuition below, we compare a fully unbiased contest to an alternating contest that is signi…cantly away from a fully unbiased contest, but for which calculations remain simple; that is, an alternating contest with = 2. 18 We visualize the contest with = 1 in Figure 2 and that with = 2 in 
are computed using (5), (7) and (8) . The values at all the other nodes are similarly computed. 19 At the bottom of each …gure, the total e¤ort at node (0,0) is calculated using (9) and is labeled as "…rst e¤ect."The label "third e¤ect"describes the total e¤ort at node (1,1) weighted by the probability of existence of node (1,1). Comparing …gures 2 and 3, it is now easy to verify that, when moving from a fully unbiased to an alternating contest with = 2, the bene…cial e¤ect on e¤orts of increasing the probability of existence of node (1,1) is 1 7 1 8 ' 0:018, and the decrease in e¤orts at node (0,0) is 21 64 26 81 ' 0:00 7. The former is greater than the latter, hence implying that = 2 dominates = 1, and more generally that a fully unbiased contest is not optimal.
The qualitative conclusions drawn from the numerical examples of Figure 2 and Figure 3 are proven generally true in Proposition 2, which shows that f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g is a saddle rather than a maximum for T E. In the proof we directly make use of the alternating contests to show that a fully unbiased contest can be improved upon. 20 1 7 The second e¤ect has also zero derivative at = 1. 1 8 While an alternating contest with = 2 su¢ ces to show that a fully unbiased contest can be improved upon by an alternating contest, numerical simulations show that the T E-maximizing alternating contest has ' 4:21. Moving from a fully unbiased to the optimal alternating contest, the probability of existence of node (1,1) increases from 0:25 to 0:41. 1 9 In Figure 3 , we approximated the values in …rst and second matches, without losing the qualitative features of any comparisons.
2 0 The proof of Proposition 2 works as follows. We quantify the three e¤ects by plugging = 1 in the second Proposition 2 Consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. With victory-independent biases, the point f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g is a saddle for T E in R 3 >0 .
In Appendix C we provide the extensive analytical proof of Proposition 2. Here, we provide a short proof that calculates an analytical expression for T E that is best checked by a computer software, such as Mathematica. 21 Proof. We consider moving away from f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g in two directions. The …rst direction is f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1; 1g; since the continuation values of the …rst match are identical between players, the players' incentives in the …rst match are the same as in a one-shot contest, where it is well known that b = 0 gives a local maximum for total e¤ort (e.g., Franke, 2012) . The second direction is f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1 b; 1g; 22 we show below that along this direction b = 0 is a local minimum. This establishes that in the f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g-space, f1; 1; 1g is a saddle.
Plugging f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1 b; 1g into the formulae in Section 3, the expected total e¤ort derivative with respect to of the …rst e¤ect, obtaining 0:071V , of the second e¤ect, obtaining 0:017V , and of the third e¤ect, obtaining 0:087V . Therefore, we obtain that; i) the overall second derivative is positive, proving our claim, and ii) the third e¤ect su¢ ces to overcome the …rst e¤ect, which is the only negative one. 2 1 The code is available from the authors upon request. Note for the referees: the code can be found here: https://www.dropbox.com/s/fme1hest4vcb5yg/Mathematica%20Files%20for%20Reviewers.zip?dl=0. 2 2 This is an algebraically convenient linearization of the alternating contest structure. Thus, b = 0 is a local minimum.
Robustness of Proposition 2. Since we deem Proposition 2 to be the most striking result of the paper, we perform a number of robustness tests. First, while we followed the vast majority of the literature on contests and maximize T E, in Appendix D we show that Proposition 2 carries over to the maximization of the expected winner's e¤ort. Second, while the Tullock contest is broadly used, another well-studied model of contest is that of all-pay auctions; in Appendix E we show the robustness of Proposition 2 to an all-pay-auction model. Third, in Appendix F we merge the two previous robustness tests and show that Proposition 2 carries over to the maximization of the expected winner's e¤ort in an all-pay-auction model.
Globally Optimal Contest. De…ne the globally optimal contest as the best-of-three contest with T E-maximizing biases f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g. In the remainder of this section, we provide numerical features of the globally optimal contest, which is of independent interest.
Numerical simulations show that the globally optimal contest has f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g ' f5:22; 0:33; 0:75g:
Thus, it is optimal to give a large (approx. 5) advantage to player X in the …rst match, and balance it out with a medium (approx. 3) advantage to player Y in the second match and a small (approx. 4=3) advantage to player Y in the third match, if necessary. This structure is not far from an alternating contest. Moreover, one can show that the optimal alternating contest already attains 81% of the improvement achieved by the globally optimal contest over the fully unbiased contest. 23 Reasonably, in the optimal alternating contest ' 4:21, which is in-between the …rstmatch advantage given to X (approx. 5) and the second-match advantage given to Y (approx. 3) of the globally optimal contest. Next, we analyze the globally optimal contest through the light of the equilibrium winning probabilities. In particular, evaluating p X at each node, we obtain In (0; 0), on the one hand, the optimal bias yields a substantial departure from p X = 0:5. On the other hand, it is less than what would happen without dynamics; in fact, if we apply the globally optimal 1 to a one-shot contest, we obtain p X ' 5:22=6:22 ' 0:839. Instead, with dynamics, one needs to account for the future advantages of Y . In (0; 1), it is not at all surprising to obtain a small p X . In fact, two e¤ects point in the same direction: Y is both one-match ahead and advantaged by the bias. Instead, in (1; 0), while Y is still advantaged by the bias, she is lagging one match behind. The bias favoring Y more than compensates for her disadvantage of lagging one match behindi.e., p (1;0) X < 1=2. In the last node (1; 1) the stakes are the same for X and Y . Thus, what accounts for p (1;1) X being di¤erent than 1=2 is solely the mechanical e¤ect of 3 6 = 1. Combining the above …ndings, we calculate that the ex-ante probability of victory in the best-of-three contest for player X is 0:488.
Conclusions
We analyze the e¤ort-maximizing biases in a best-of-three contest. The …rst contribution (Section 4) is to show that the conventional wisdom of optimality of unbiased contest carries over to a setting where an e¤ort-maximizing designer can tailor the biases to the outcome of previous matches; that is, by giving a player a di¤erent advantage or disadvantage tomorrow whether she won or lost today. Speci…cally, we characterize the optimal vector of biases, and show that it eliminates the well-known "discouragement e¤ect", and leaves the two ex-ante identical players equally likely to win at each match, regardless of who is leading in terms of past matches won, and therefore in the entire contest; the conventional wisdom of the optimality of unbiased contest still holds.
The second contribution of the paper (Section 5) is to show that such optimality of unbiased contest does not carry over when the e¤ort-maximizing designer cannot tailor the biases to the outcome of the previous matches. We characterize the optimal vector of biases and show that it resembles an observed pattern in real life; namely, the alternation of advantages between players, followed by an unbiased tie-breaker. At the optimum, the two ex-ante identical players are not equally likely to win in equilibrium, both at each match and in the overall contest; hence, the prescription is to not treat identical players identically, as a biased contest stimulates more e¤orts than an unbiased contest. We show that this result holds when matches are modeled both as Tullock contests and all-pay auctions, and both under maximization of total e¤ort and winner's e¤ort; so, the conventional wisdom of optimality of unbiased contest fails.
This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst cut into challenging the conventional wisdom of the optimality of unbiased contest in a best-of-three contest. Being the …rst cut, the present paper leaves sizeable room for future extensions. First, we analyzed the optimal vectors of victory-dependent and victory-independent biases, assuming that the designer has full control over the size of such biases; an interesting extension is that of exogenous-value biases to be allocated by the designer either to player X or to Y . Second, while our analysis focused on best-of-three contests, we conjecture that the suboptimality of an unbiased contest between ex-ante identical players carries over to best-of-n contests, since the same logic we explored appears to hold when comparing the vector of victory-independent biases f ; 1= ; 1; :::; 1g and f1; 1; 1; :::; 1g because of two e¤ects; the symmetry of the continuation values from the third match onwards, and the higher probability of reaching nodes where players have the same number of victories. Nevertheless, the structure of the globally optimal biases in a best-of-n contest is not a priori clear, and thus left to future research. We specialize the general analysis of Section 3, i.e. equations (3)-(8), to each node.
Node (1,1). Since (1,1) is the last match, u
Thus,
Node (1,0). Recall that at (1,0), if player X wins the game ends, otherwise the game moves to node (1,1). Thus,
Therefore, plugging the above into (3)-(8), we obtain
Node (0,1). Symmetrically to the above analysis for node (1,0),
Node (0,0). All equilibrium e¤orts, probabilities and payo¤s can be obtained as above, plugging into (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8), the following
For the sake of space, we do not report here the explicit formulae.
B Benchmark; victory-dependent biases
Proof of Proposition 1. We iteratively use the formulae (7) and (8) into (9) to characterize the total e¤ort node-by-node, to then plug them into T E. We express T E, rather than as a function of 's, as a function of p (B; C) . This function is strictly concave for fA; Dg 2 (0; 1) 2 . To see this, note that
Therefore, the Hessian matrix of T E AD (B; C) is a diagonal, negative de…nite matrix for fA; Dg 2 (0; 1) 2 . In this case, we can solve for B and C with the FOCs, which give
Thus, (13) has to hold in the maximum fA ; B ; C ; D g if fA ; D g 2 (0; 1) 2 , i.e., we must have B = (A ; D ) and C = (A ; D ) : Note that we can use one of the formulations in (13) as soon as 1 A (1 D) 6 = 0 or 1 D (1 A) 6 = 0, and this is useful to rule out the possibility of a corner global maximum for T E (A; B; C; D). Consider for instance A = 1 and D < 1. Then T E does not depend on C as node (0,1) is never reached, and thus it only depends on B and D.
We can repeat the reasoning leading to (13) to show that the optimal B in this case must solve B = (1; D) = 1 D 2 by concavity and (13) . Thus, evaluating T E at A = 1 and
, which is maximized at D = 1=3. These values yield T E(1; 1=3; c; 1=3) = 16 27 < 11 16 = T E(1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2), thus this corner cannot be optimal. Similar reasoning rules out the other corners for which we can use one of the two formulae in (13) , which also give T E = 16 27 . To …nish the proof that the maximum must be interior, notice that T E (0; B; C; 0) = T E (1; B; C; 1) = 0, so that fA; Dg = f0; 0g and fA; Dg = f1; 1g cannot be optimal. The above establishes that in any global maximum for T E, we must have fA ; B ; C ; D g 2 (0; 1) 4 ; B = (A ; D ) ; and C = (A ; D ).
To show that the only possibility is fA ; B ; C ; D g = f1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2g, we proceed in several steps. We begin by establishing that in our search for a global maximum we must satisfy the constraint A + D = 1: To see this, we show that, for any fA; Dg 2 (0; 1) 2 , we have
with equality only if A + D = 1. Indeed, after a few algebraic steps, 24 we have
where
We now show that r (A; D) < 0 by showing that
Proceeding as above, we obtain Since
we have veri…ed that r (A; D) < 0; and hence, using (14) , that
with equality only if A + D = 1.
We now proceed to look for the global maximum of T E (A; (A; D) ; (A; D) ; D) by maximizing T E 1+A D 2 ; 1 2 ; 1 2 ; 1 A+D 2 for A and D: We obtain
with equality only if A = D.
Concatenating our previous inequalities, we have that for any fA; B; C; Dg 2 (0; 1) 
C Victory-independent biases
Proof of Proposition 2. Since we know that along f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1; 1g b = 0 gives a local maximum for T E, we focus here only on showing that along f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1 b; 1g b = 0 gives a local minimum for T E, so that f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g is a saddle. We divide the proof into the three e¤ects spelled out in the main text, the …rst (second, third) e¤ect referring to the T E in the …rst (second, third) match. We analyse from the third to the …rst e¤ect.
Third e¤ect. We quantify the e¤ect on T E of node (1,1) only, thus weighted by the probability of getting to node (1,1). Using (10) with 3 = 1, we obtain that such e¤ect on T E equals
Setting 1 = 1 + b and 2 = 1 b, we compute dp
Notice that @ u (0;1) X @b = @ u (0;1) Y @b = 0 since they only depend on 3 which we keep …xed at 1. Thus, the above displayed equation reads dp (0;1) X db = @p
where in the last step we used (5) and (6) . Similarly, dp
Finally, dp (0;0) X db = @p
Thus, the derivative of (17) equals
We evaluate the above at b = 0 using formulae of Appendix A and obtain 25 Since the above equals 0, the …rst derivative of the third e¤ect evaluates to 0. Thus, we have to consider the second derivative of (17). Using p 
Evaluating the above at b = 0 we obtain 26 
Therefore we obtain that the overall third e¤ect is positive and quanti…ed by (19) .
Second e¤ect. We quantify the e¤ect on T E of nodes (1,0) and (0,1), thus weighted by the probability of getting to those two nodes. 
At node (1,0), by 3 = 1 and (11), we have u
. At node (0,1), by 3 = 1 and (12), we have u
. We di¤erentiate (20) and obtain dp
Since dp (0;0) Y db = dp (0;0) X db and since from (3) and (4) we obtain that, when b ! 0, x (1;0) + y (1;0) = x (0;1) + y (0;1) , then, at b = 0, the above …rst derivative evaluates to
Now rewrite (9) as x (1;0) + y (1;0) = u
, and use this to
Since d 2(b) db = 1, evaluating the above at b = 0 we have
Therefore, as for the third e¤ect, the …rst derivative evaluates to 0 and we thus move to the analysis of the second derivative. We di¤erentiate (21) and obtain
x (1;0) + y (1;0) + 2 dp When we evaluate this expression at b = 0, the …rst and fourth summands cancel out, as e¤orts are x (1;0) + y (1;0) = x (0;1) + y (0;1) and
Thus, we are left with 2 dp
Using (18) Now in (24) we focus on the term
. Di¤erentiating (23), we obtain
A ;
which at b = 0 evaluates to Similarly,
which at b = 0 evaluates to 
Therefore we obtain that the overall second e¤ect is positive and quanti…ed by (25) .
First e¤ect. We quantify the e¤ect on T E of node (0,0). We rewrite the sum of e¤orts using (9) as
So,
Note that 2p De…ning
x 2 (x+3) 2 , and using the formulae of Appendix A, we can write 27 u
which evaluates to 0. Therefore, d x (0;0) + y (0;0) db b=0 = 0:
Thus, we move to evaluate the second derivative of (26);
A :
Using the de…nition of h( ) above, we write
which evaluated at 2 = 1, gives 2h 00 (1) + 2h 0 (1) = 2 69 64 V + 2 3 4 V = 21 32 V . Using (18), Therefore we obtain that the overall …rst e¤ect is negative and quanti…ed by (27) .
Overall second derivative. We can …nally put together the three e¤ects, and conclude that along the direction f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1 b; 1g, b = 0 is a local minimum since the …rst derivative of the total e¤ort with respect to b is 0, and the second derivative equals 39 
The top line of W E is player X's overall e¤ort considering all instances when she wins, and the bottom line does the same for player Y .
Proposition 3 Consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. With victory-dependent biases, the point f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g is a saddle for W E in R 3 >0 .
Proof. We follow the structure of Proof of Proposition 2 provided in the main text. 28
As we did for T E(b), we separate numerator and denominator and one could verify that 
E Robustness to the all-pay auction
In this last Section of the Appendix we provide robustness tests of the Tullock contest analysed in the main text to the all-pay auction. That is, we replace (1) with the following;
In an all-pay auction (APA), we assume private information with marginal costs distributed on [1; +1) with density f (c) = 1=c 2 and cumulative F (c) = 1 1=c. 29 Our choice of adding private information to the APA is driven by the fact that with full information rents would be fully dissipated, thus making our exercise non-interesting. Additionally, in every match, a new pair of realizations of marginal costs are independently drawn. This is convenient to avoid learning over matches, which would obfuscate the main objective of the all-pay auction exercise.
In this Section we keep the same notation for u W X ; u L X ; u W Y ; u L Y ; u X ; u Y as for the Tullock contest. In an APA, a strategy is a function x(c) for player X and y(c) for player Y . We look for a strictly increasing equilibrium so ties do not happen with positive probability in equilibrium. Following Amann and Leininger (1996) we de…ne a function k(c) that matches cost-type c of player X with cost-type k(c) of player Y that bids the same e¤ective amount taking into account the bias . Thus, k(c) = y 1 ( x(c)):
Expected individual payo¤ of cost-type c of player X who behaves as c 0
Its …rst derivative reads
Since the FOC must hold at c 0 = c, we obtain the di¤erential equation
Similarly,
which evaluated at k(c) gives
Since k 0 (c) = x 0 (c) y 0 (k(c)) , the above displayed equation reads
Putting together (29) and (30) we obtain
For our chosen PDF, we obtain
Integrating with the boundary condition k(1) = 1 we have
Therefore the ex-ante winning probability of X is
Naturally, p Y = 1 p X .
Substituting (31) into (29), we obtain
and integrating, we obtain
Similar steps yield the following
Thus, the expected e¤orts read
Finally, payo¤s are
And similarly,
The APA equivalent of the Tullock property (9) is
We now specialize the above general analysis to each node, as we did in Appendix A for the Tullock contest. While at each node the equilibrium expected payo¤s and probabilities of victory have the same functional forms as in the Tullock contest (e.g., compare (32) and (35) with (5) and (7)), the equilibrium expected e¤orts are not (compare (33) and (3)). Therefore, in what follows, we spell out only e¤orts.
Node (1,1). Since (1,1) is the last match, u X = u Y = V and u L X = u L Y = 0. Thus,
Node (1,0). Plugging u X and u Y into (33) and (34), we obtain
Node (0,1). Symmetrically to the above analysis for node (1, 0) ,
Node (0,0). Equilibrium e¤orts can be obtained as above.
From the above, we retrieve the main result for APA, which mirrors Proposition 2 for Tullock contests; namely, a fully unbiased contest is not optimal. In fact, the following proposition shows that f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g is a saddle rather than a maximum for T E. In Appendix F we show that the result carries over to the maximization of expected winner's e¤ort W E. Proposition 4 Consider a best-of-three APA between two ex-ante identical players. With victoryindependent biases, the point f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g is a saddle for T E in R 3 >0 .
In Appendix G we provide an extensive analytical derivation of the result. Here, we provide a short proof that calculates an analytical expression for T E which is best checked by a computer software, such as Mathematica. 30 Proof. We consider moving away from f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g in two directions. The …rst direction is f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1; 1g; since the continuation values of the …rst match are identical between players, the players' incentives in the …rst match are the same as in a one-shot contest, where it is well known that b = 0 gives a local maximum for total e¤ort (Clark and Riis, 2000; Section 4). The second direction draws an intuition from a typical practice in sports; namely, the alternation of home matches between X and Y , followed by an unbiased tie-breaker (i.e., the …nal match). In fact, after setting f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1 b; 1g, we show below that along this direction b = 0 is a local minimum. This establishes that in the f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g-space, f1; 1; 1g is a saddle.
Plugging f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1 b; 1g into the formulae in the beginning of Appendix E, the expected total e¤ort is:
Now de…ne the numerator n(b) 5(39508 335818b + 1265867b 2 + o(b 2 )) and the denominator d Thus, b = 0 is a local minimum.
Optimal Contest. Numerical simulations show that the globally optimal contest requires f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g ' f9:21; 0:21; 0:76g. Thus, it is optimal to give a large (approx. 9) advantage to player X in the …rst match, and balance it out with a medium (approx. 5) advantage to player Y in the second match and a small (approx. 4=3) advantage to player Y in the third match, if necessary. This structure suggests an alternating contest, as it was the case for the globally optimal Tullock contest. Moreover, the optimal alternating contest already attains 94% of the improvement achieved by the unconstrained maximum over the fully unbiased contest. 31 The intuition why the alternating contest improves upon the fully unbiased contest and the qualitative features of the equilibrium winning probabilities are identical to the ones already given for Tullock contests. 32 F Robustness to maximization of winner' s e¤ort in all-pay auction The de…nition of W E is (28) . We obtain, Proposition 5 Consider a best-of-three APA between two ex-ante identical players. With victoryindependent biases, the point f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1; 1; 1g is a saddle for W E in R 3 >0 . 3 1 The globally optimal contest improves T E vs. the fully unbiased contest by 8:80%. The optimal alternating contest (achieved at ' 7:13) improves T E vs. the fully unbiased contest by 8:29%. 3 2 All qualitative comparisons we discussed for Tullock contests go through despite a few numerical di¤erences. First, the e¤ort di¤erence between the optimal alternating contest vs. the fully unbiased contest, conditional on reaching each node, is 0:059V in node (0,0), +0:033V in node (1,0), 0:074V in node (0,1), and clearly 0 in node (1, 1) . Second, the second derivative of T E with respect to evaluated at = 1 for an alternating contest is 0:034V for the …rst e¤ect, 0:020V for the second e¤ect, and 0:058V for the third. More precisely, these number are 65 1792 V; 54 363 2744 000 V; 13 224 V . Third, the probability of existence of node (1,1) increases from 0:25 to 0:52. Fourth, the ex-ante probability of victory of the best-of-three contest by player X is 0:487, and the probabilities of victory node-by-node are, p Proof. We follow the structure of Proof of Proposition 4 provided in Appendix E. 33 W E(b) = 7(243040 2430400b + 10943997b 2 + o(b 2 )) 384(19600 196000b + 881529b 2 + o(b 2 )) :
As we did for T E(b), we separate numerator and denominator and one could verify that n 0 (0)d(0) n(0)d 0 (0) = 0 n 00 (0)d(0) n(0)d 00 (0) = 35280 7243 > 0:
Again, b = 0 is a local minimum under the constraint f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f1 + b; 1 b; 1g. This establishes the result. thus, the …rst derivative of the second e¤ect equals zero. Therefore, we move to the analysis of the second derivative.
Similarly to how we reached (24) , the second derivative of the second e¤ect equals 4 dp 
Notice that (18) applies equally well to Tullock and APA because probabilities and 's are identical. Therefore, dp 
Now we evaluate in what follows the two remaining terms of (40) separately namely d 2 (x (1;0) +y (1;0) ) db 2 and d 2 (x (0;1) +y (0;1) ) db 2
, which we respectively compute by di¤erentiating again (38) and (39) . Thus, we obtain V:
